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IN THE SUPREME COURT

of the
STATE OF UTAH

LEONARD J. HUDSON,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
No. 8655

vs.
FLOYD W. DECKER,
Defendant and Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

N~TURE

OF CASE

This is an appeal by the plaintiff and appellant, hereinafter called the Plaintiff, from a directed verdict in favor of the defendant and respondent, hereinafter called the Defendant. The action
was brought by the Plaintiff, a guest in the automobile of the Defendant at the time of an automobile
accident, under the Idaho Guest Statute, that being
1
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the state in which the accident occurred. Plaintiff proved that the automobile driven by the Defendant down a canyon and around a curve at a
moderate rate of speed left the highway and rolled
down a dugway on the side of the road. The question is whether or not that evidence was sufficient
to raise an issue for the jury under the allegation
of plaintiff's complaint that "the defendant drove
his said automobile in such an unlawful manner
and with such reckless and wanton disregard for
the safety of the plaintiff that said automobile
overturned and plaintiff was severely injured as
hereinafter more particularly alleged" (R. 2).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is no substantial dispute between the
Plaintiff and the Defendant as to what the evidence shows the facts to be and we would concur
in a general way w·ith \vhat the Plaintiff has said
those facts are in his brief filed herein. However,
it may be helpful to the court for the Defendant
to briefly reYie\v the background of the accident
and point out that eYidence which he feels is particularly iluportant. In doing so the Defendant will
adopt the san1e procedure used by the Plaintiff and
will refer to the first volun1e of the record as
( R. ______ ) and tht~ second volun1e of the record as
(T. ______ ).

Plaintiff and Defendant, en1ployees of the
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United States Air Force Base at Hill Field, Utah,
were temporarily assigned to the Larson Air Force
Base Moses Lake Washington for one month's duty,
'
'
extending
from May
17, 1955 to June 17, 1955.
Defendant desired company for the return automdbile trip to the parties' residences in Utah and
requested Plaintiff to ride with him.
On June 17, 1955 Plaintiff and Defendant,
in Defendant's 1950 Plymouth sedan, drove from
Moses Lake, Washington to Spokane, Washington
where they lodged over-night; and then about five
o'clock A.M. on June 18, 1955 commenced driving
from Spokane, Washington to the place in Idaho
where the accident occurred. Defendant drove and
Plaintiff was a non-paying guest passenger (see
Plaintiff's complaint, R. 1, 2, 3 and Plaintiff's
Brief, pp 2-3). There were a number of other employees in other cars who left ~IIoses Lake, Washington about the same time as the Plaintiff and
Defendant, many of them taking different routes.
The witnesses, Harmon W. Cheney and James
L. Larsen, and others were following the same route
al!d vvrere apparently behind the Decker vehicle (T.
17-18). Between Idaho and Montana they were some
ten minutes behind (T. 18) but caught the Decker
vehicle before they got to Missoula, Montana in the
forenoon of June 18, 1955 (T. 18). The two vehicles became separated again in Missoula, where
3
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the witnesses remained close to three-quarters of
an hour (T. 19). The witnesses were apparently
catching the Decker vehicle at the time of the accident as they arrived at the scene of the accident
approximately ten minutes after it had occurred
(T. 20). They had driven at a speed of around 60
miles per hour between Missoula and this point,
just over the Montana-Idaho border on U. S. Highway 93 (T. 20-50).
U. S. Highway 93, which runs between Missoula, Montana and Salmon, Idaho, is straight and
level for several miles until just before it reaches
the Idaho border coming from the north, where the
road enters a group of mountains which are a part
of the Rocky Mountain Range (T. 33) and which
also constitute the Continental Divide (T. 33) and
the border line between Idaho and Montana. The
road reaches its highest point at Lost Trail Pass
( T. 51) and then starts down a canyon. As the
road descends on the Idaho side there are a couple
of curves which are not too severe before it reaches
the point where this accident occurred (T. 21).
The Defendant, Floyd W. Decker, testified
that as he started down from the top of the pass he
was traveling between 30 and 40 miles per hour and
continued driving at such speed until immediately
before the accident (T. 51). As he approached the
immediate area where the accident occurred there
4
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were two rather bad curves (T. 52). The witness
was going around 30 to 40 miles per hour as he
came to the first curve, but by the time he came
to the second he had reduced his speed to between
5 and 10 miles per hour (T. 53-54), at which point
his automobile left the highway.
The second curve is pictured in Exhibits C, D
and E, which pictures were all taken looking down
the canyon, the direction in which the Decker vehicle was traveling ( T. 16) .
'The witness Harmon W. Cheney has identified
the track shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit D, which is
marked with an "x", as the path which was apparently followed by the Decker vehicle in going off
the road as it failed to complete the turn. He has
made an "x" on Plaintiff's Exhrbit C which is the
location in which the vehicle which he was driving
was parked when they arrived at the scene of the
accident. Exhibits F and G are pictures of the
Decker vehicle as it came to rest after going off the
highway (T. 11).
The Plaintiff, Leonard J. Hudson, testified
that as they were traveling down the canyon they
had slowed down to pass some trucks, and at the
time they passed the trucks he turned around to get
a road map from the back seat and that just as he
turned around to the front seat again Mr. Decker
5
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said, "Duck", and they went over the bank (T.
164). Immediately after passing the trucks they
were traveling at a speed of about 40 miles per
hour, but he did not continue to watch the speedometer, and while he knew they had slowed down
considerably he did not know exactly what speed
they were traveling when the car went over the
bank ( R. 64-65) .
One of the witnesses, James L. Larsen, stated
that the shoulder on the edge of the road where the
Decker car went off was very narrow and appeared
to be fairly soft (T. 44-45) . 'The shoulder in the
vicinity of where the car vvent off was messed up
to some extent and there was not more than a foot
or two of shoulder ( T. 45) . And at one time he
estimated the width to be six inches ( T. 45).
The witness, Harmon W. Cheney, stated that
the oiled surface of the highway in the vicinity of
the curve was covered with loose sand or fine gravel
extending from a point half way to the center line
to the edge of the road, and as he drove around this
curve at the time he arrived he was definitely aware
of the fact that his car was traveling through sand
and gravel and could feel it under the \Vheels of his
car (T. 28-29).
The rest of the evidence concerns the damage
to the Decker vehicle and the injuries which Plain6
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tiff may have sustained and other matters not pertinent to the question of liability.
At the conclusion of the evidence the Defendant moved for a directed verdict in his favor, which
was granted by the court. The court in directing
its verdict concluded:
" . . . there is no evidence in this case
which has been introduced by the plaintiff,
or any evidence at all in the case, which the
Court feels justified submitting the case to
the jury on the theory that the plaintiff
evidenced a reckless disregard for the safety
of his guest, in the operation of his vehicle,
at the time and in the locality where the accident took place. There may have been
negligence on the part of the defendant, but
if that negligence did exist it didn't amount
to wilful misconduct. The Court feels further
that to submit this case to the jury would
have permitted the jury to conjecture, by inference and otherwise, to the causation of the
accident, which does not appear with any
degree of certainty in the record, and therefore the Court feels the motion is well taken."
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT FOR
THE REASON THAT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO RAISE A JURY QUESTION ON THE
ISSUE OF LIABILITY.

7
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT FOR
THE REASON THAT THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT
EVIDENCE TO RAISE A JURY QUESTION ON THE
ISSUE OF LIABILITY.

We do not disagree with the statement in Plaintiff's Brief to the effect that few things are more
devastating to a trial lawyer than a directed verdict.
We might suggest, however, that a rule more fundamental and vital to our system of law is the rule
that liability should not be imposed upon an individual without fault. Nor would we contend that
if the trial judge has serious doubts as to whether
a Motion For Directed Verdict is well taken he
might submit the case to the jury and then, if he
thinks it improper, set aside the verdict as against
the weight of the evidence. However, if the trial
judge is convinced, prior to the time that the case
is submitted to the jury, that if the jury should
return a verdict in favor of the plaintiff he would
have to set the same aside and enter a judgment,
notwithstanding the verdict, in favor of the defendant, then the court would be requiring the jury to
perform an act without any meaning or signifiance, merely in the hope that the jury might agree
with him and thus obviate the necessity of his granting the motion.
8
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Nor do we take issue with the Plaintiff's argument to the effect that the court must consider and
apply the evidence in the light most favorable to
the plaintiff and if, in considering it in that light,
the jury might reasonably find the issues in favor
of the Plain tiff then the trial court should submit
the issues to the jury.
We would further agree that the Plain tiff has
correctly stated the definition of Defendant's conduct on which liability must rest in this case, as defined in the Idaho Guest Statute, section 49-1001,
which provides:
''No person transported by the owner
or opera tor of a motor vehicle as his guest
without payment for such transportation
shall have a cause for damages against such
owner or operator for injuries, death or loss,
in case of accident, unless such accident shall
have been intentional on the part of the said
owner or operator or caused by his intoxication or his reckless disregard of the rights of
others."
The Idaho Supreme Court, in the cases cited in
Plaintiff's Brief, Forberg v. Harrison, 71 Idaho 11,
225 P. (2d) 69, 71 and Turner v. Purdum (Idaho),
289 P. (2d) 608, 611 has further explained the
Idaho Statute as follows:
"The term 'reckless disregard' as used
in said section means an act or conduct
destitute of heed or concern for consequences;
especially foolishly heedless of danger, head9
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long rash; wan ton disregard, or conscious indifference to consequences."
The fundamental question reduces itself to this:
Was there sufficient evidence before the court from
which the jury might reasonably have found that
the Defendant in this case was guilty of wilful misconduct or reckless disregard of the rights of others
as that term has been defined by the Idaho Supreme
Court? Since there was no evidence of any misconduct on the part of the Defendant, except that the
auto1nobile which he was driving at a moderate rate
of speed ran off of the highway and turned over,
the ultimate question is whether the jury might
reasonably draw the inference from this that the
Defendant was guilty of the required misconduct.
In approaching this problem we must keep in
mind the distinction between an affirmative act,
which causes an accident, and the absence of any evidence of any act, which may have caused an accident. It is for this reason that the case of Hebert
v. Allen (Iowa), 41 N. W. (2d) 240 is not in point.
In that case, the defendant, traveling 15 to 20 miles
per hour on a straight road on a day which was
clear and bright, there being no vehicles in sight
and the terrain being flat and there being no unusual condition and no other reason shown, suddenly turned his car from the highway into a telephone pole. It appears that there was no question
10
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in that case as to what caused the accident, the sudden and unexplained turning of the car. The jury
was not, therefore, required to infer any course of
conduct from the fact that the accident occurred.
They are simply presented with the evidence that
the driver, without any possible reason for doing
so, suddenly turned his car off of a straight road
in to a telephone pole, and they are asked to determine if that course of conduct in their opinion constitutes "reckless operation of the car". Moreover,
there was in that case some evidence that the car
was deliberately turned into the telephone pole in
an effort to scare passengers who were riding on
the right running board of the car and who vvere
pinned between the car and the running board at
the time the car passed the telephone pole.
The affirmative act in Orico v. Williams
(Conn.), 97 A. ( 2d) 556 was the deliberate backing
of an autor.aobile into a tree at a relatively high
rate of speed. This case is also distinguishable in
that the court in that case is talking about an inference of negligence rather than an inference of recklessness.
The case of Thompson v. Kost (Ky.), 194 S.
W. (2d) 976 comes the nearest to sustaining Plaintiff's position, where the court held that negligence
might be inferred when a car, traveling down a
road, with no apparent reason to do so, suddenly
11
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swerved from one side of the road to the other and
then over onto the other side of the road and off
the road. However, again we are only speaking of
negligence and there is again some evidence of other
misconduct, the accident occurring at five o'clock
A.M. and there being some evidence of drinking.
The Montana court dismissed the problem
rather summarily in Doheny v. Coverdale, 68 Pac.
(2d) 142. In that case the car, which had apparently been traveling on the right side of the road,
turned to its left at an angle of approximately 45
degrees and went off the road and headon into a
large tree. When the other facts in the case are
considered together with the evidence of affirmatively turning from a direct course on the highway,
the decision appears to be based partly on a consideration of other evidence. The four parties in
the car at the time of the accident, two girls and two
fellows, had been out all night and the accident occurred at twenty minutes before fiYe o'clock in the
morning.
We agree with the Plaintiff that it is often impossible to show the mental attitude of an individual
and the only thing that can be shown is the act, from
which the mental attitude may be inferred. But we
ask, from what act in this case are we to draw such
an inference? The only evidence in this case is that
the car, traveling around a curYe at a moderate
12
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speed, for some reason went off the highway and
rolled down in to the canyon. There has been no
proof of any circumstances that would show, or tend
to show that the Defendant deliberately turned his
vehicle off the highway, or that he drove around the
curve at too high a rate of speed under the existing
circumstances, or that he failed to exercise reasonable control over his car, or that he drove his car
when he was not in a fit condition to do so. The
facetiousness of Plaintiff's argument is illustrated
by the fact that while it is inferred throughout the
entire Brief that the Defendant deliberately drove
his vehicle off the side of the road, he, himself, is
unable to make that inference and begins his argument on page 17 of his Brief:
"Assume, for purpose of discussion only,
that Defendant did in fact consciously and
intentionally drive his automobile off the embankment in this case."
As was said in the case of Hewitt v. General
Tire & Rubber Company, 3 Utah (2d) 354, 284 P.
(2d) 471, in which the issue involved was mere
negligence and not recklessness,
"It is well settled that mere proof of an
injury to plaintiff will not justify a verdict
or judgment imposing liability upon the defendant and if the evidence does not shQw any
negligence on the part of the defendant, there
can be no recovery, regardless of the fact that
plaintiff was not negligent."
13
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There are a number of explanations, or inferences if you will, as to how this accident may have
happened. These may or may not have constituted
negligence. Except for the last they surely do not
constitute recklessness. The driver's attention may
have been diverted to something he saw in the surrounding area or by the activity of his companion
who was turning around looking for something in
the back seat. Something may have happened to
the steering apparatus on his vehicle and he might
thereafter have been unable to steer the car properly. Although only traveling at a moderate and
reasonable rate of speed, that speed may have been
too high a rate of speed for the particular curve in
question and may have caused him to go off the side
of t~e road. He may have reasonably gotten over
to the side of the road and the shoulder n1ight have
crumpled away beneath his car. He may have
skidded on the gravel on the road in a manner not
reasonably to be anticipated. He may have deliberately driven his car off of the road. This last inference, which is apparently the inference Plaintiff
would have us 1nake, or at least permit the jury to
make, requires that we find the Defendant, with no
malice toward his friend or no other reason, would
deliberately risk his own life and expose hin1self to
serious injury.
It should be noted that the Plaintiff in this
14
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case called the Defendant as an adverse witness. At
such time he could have, had he chosen to do so,
examined the Defendant on such matters as lookout,
skidding, his control or lack of control over his
vehicle, and other matters which may have explained
this accident. His failure to do so can only be attributed to two reasons. Either he was afraid of
the answers he might get, that is, that the Defendant
had a reasonable explanation for the accident; or he
expected the Defendant to assume the burden of
proving himself free from fault, the burden which
he now attempts to impose upon the Defendant by
this appeal, and was disappointed by Defendant's
failure to undertake this burden.
It is fundamental, as we have pointed out
earlier in this Brief, that until there is evidence of
conduct on the part of the Defendant which requires
an explanation he should not be required to furnish
such explanation. Nor is it proper to infer from the
fact that the Defendant profers no explanation,
where none is required, that he could not satisfactorily explain an event were he required to do so.
vVe have addressed ourselves to this point in
the Brief principally to the Plaintiff's failure to
prove his case, which seems to presume that the
Plaintiff may have been able to do so had he proceeded properly. The Record in this case warrants
no such presumption. Viewed in its most logical
lQ

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

light, the evidence simply discloses that the Defendant, in driving his car at a moderate rate of speed
down a canyon, lost control of the car on a curve
and :ran off the side of the road and down an embankment. As said by the trial judge, this may constitute negligence but an analysis of the cases discloses that it is not evidence of recklessness.
In the case of Hollenbach v. Fairbanks (Colo.),
287 P. ( 2d) 53, where a vehicle coming down a
grade and around a curve skidded out of control to
the wrong side of the road and down an embankment, the court held that the mere occurrence of
the accident does not imply negligence and the evidence failed to establish that the driver of the truck
acted in wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of
others within an automobile guest statute.
In the case of Hawkins v. L. C. Jones Trucking Company (Wyo.), 232 Pac. (2d) 1014 the evidence was that the defendant permitted his automobile to skid from the right to the left side of the
highway into the path of an approaching truck.
The defendant did not remember so doing, and offered no explanation. The eYidence was that the defendant may have permitted his automobile to skid
over onto the left side of the highway and into the
path of an approaching truck. The court held this
did not constitute recklessness, and in so doing
16

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

quoted from cases which are appropriate here as
follows:
"In Burke v. Cook, 246 Mass. 518, 141
N.E. 585, 586, the facts considered were
these: The action was by a guest to recover
from his automobile host for injuries sustained in an accident which happened as follows: the motor car crossed a bridge over
the Cape Cod canal going very slowly at a
place only a short distance from the scene of
the accident. The highway where the accident happened was a straight macadam road
where there was clear vision for a long distance ahead. The only other traffic was a
vehicle presently to be mentioned. There were
no people and no intersecting roadways on
this highway. After crossing the bridge the
speed of the automobile increased until a team
or truck was met or passed; a few seconds
before the accident and while the car was
'going fast' as one witness said and others
said it was going 35 miles per hour and just
as the other vehicle was passed there was a
'thump, thump' noise from the right rear
wheel and in a very short time, two or three
seconds, the auton1obile went up in the air;
turned over, struck on its top making a mark
in the hardened road as of a car sliding on its
top for three or four times its length. The
record disclosed that 'Just before the accident
the car seemed to be steering to the right ...
the defendant turned his wheel to the left, and
did it quickly, and (then) the car turned
over.' The noise mentioned above indicated
that there had been some trouble in the right
rear wheel or its tire; after the accident one
of the rear tires was found to have a long cut
17
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in it. In sustaining the defendant's exceptions the Court in part said:
" ''The defendant by written motion requested the direction of a verdict in his favor
for the stated reason that there was no evidence of gross negligence, and excepted to the
failure to direct such a verdict. The case was
submitted to the jury without any exception
to the instructions actually given, and the
plaintiff had a verdict.
" 'Clearly, if this action can be maintained by proof of what is sometimes called
ordinary negligence for the purpose of distinguishing it from gross negligence, there
was a jury issue. The rate of speed, the quick
turning of the automobile and its overturn,
together were sufficient to justify a conclusion founded on the failure to fulfill that
duty. But confessedly the plaintiff cannot
get on unless the evidence was sufficient to
uphold a verdict based on gross negligence ...

***
" 'In the opinion of a majority of the
court the speed of the car upon a roadway
substantially free from traffic without intersecting streets and without obstruction of
vision, the passing of another vehicle in the
manner described, the act of turning the
wheel quickly to the left, and the turning over
and sliding of the car as hereinbefore stated,
whether considered separately or in conjunction, do not tend to prove such "indifference
to present legal duty and utter forgetfulness
of legal obligations so far as other persons
may be affected" as to constitute "a heedless and palpable violation of legal duty" to
18
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the plaintiff or ''a manifestly smaller amount
of watchfulness and circumspection" than
the circumstances required.'

***
"It was held in Loughran v. Nolan, 307
Mass. 195, 29 N. E. 2d 737 that: A speed of
30 to 35 miles an hour at which an automobile was being operated on a dark, rainy afternoon on a narrow, winding and slippery road
would not, in and of itself, a1nount to 'gross
negligence' which would render driver liable
for injuries sustained by automobile guest,
and also that in the guest's action against the
driver for injuries sustained that the automobile was being operated at the stated speed
with road and weather conditions as related
above, the skidding of the car over the side of
a bridge and dropping into a river the fact
that the automobile skidded did not warrant
the finding of 'gross negligence' necessary to
render the driver liable.

***
"In the case at bar Bechtold had driven
for 50 miles on his own side of the road and
without experiencing any trouble and until
confronted with the situation disclosed at the
scene of the accident if there was any crossing of the center line of the highway it was
done in the last 30 to 40 feet before the impact of the collision and in a mere fraction
of a second, at the speed the two vehicles were
traveling.
"Taking the case of the plaintiff in the
most favorable view thereof as we are obliged
to do we find Nlr. Long, the driver of the L.
C. Jones Trucking Company's truck, stating
19
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in substance that when the jeep was 50 feet
in front of him it skidded and was out of
control, but not over the center line of the
highway; thereupon the driver got it under
control for 10, 15 or 20 feet and then it
skidded once more and this second time
passed across the center line of the highway
directly into his traffic lane.
"This description of the accident hardly
supplies any evidence that the driver of the
jeep, Bechtold, was at fault in skidding into
the path of the truck, nor do we find any
other evidence in the record from which it
could be so inferred ... "
In the case of Mason v. Mootz, 73 Idaho 461,
253 P. (2d) 240 it was held, in an action for the
death of one riding as a guest in an automobile that
the fact that the vehicle went over an embankment
on the side of the highway, apparently in an attempt
to avoid hitting horses on the highway, was not sufficient to make a jury question as to whether the accident was caused by the defendant's reckless disregard of the rights of others in operating the automobile. The court said:
"There is no testimony as to the speed
at which appellant was driYing prior to the
accident, except that of Platz, \vho described
it as "medium speed." This would tend to
establish that, as far as speed is concerned,
there was an absence of ordinary negligence.
The evidence as to the skid marks, their
length, the distance traYelled after going oYer
the bank, and the gouge in the earth in the
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right-of-way where it struck and inferentially
bounced to the place where it carne to rest, is,
of course, evidence of considerable speed. Although the testimony of the defense witnesses
would suggest that perhaps a part of the skid
marks observed by the deputy sheriff may
have been made by the Montague car. In any
event, there is nothing in the record to indicate that this car, travelling at 'medium' or
moderate speed, operated over the course and
in the manner it was operated, would not
make the same marks over the same distance
and otherwise behave as it did. Taken together with the testimony of Platz, who was
close to, and saw the car when it was in motion, the whole evidence would be sufficient
to go to the jury if the issue had been ordinary negligence. But, we think it is wholly
insufficient to support the claim of reckless
disregard under the guest statute.... "
Lastly, we have the case referred to in Plaintiff's Brief, Riccuiti v. Robinson, 2 Utah ( 2d) 45,
269 P. (2d) 282, in which the evidence of recklessness was much greater, in our opinion, than in the
case at bar, and in which case it was held that the
driver of a car, driven at a speed of 60 miles per
hour which ran off the road when the driver
dropped a cigarette, was not guilty of negligence.
In the words of the court the facts were:
"Plaintiff and a girl friend met defendant and his friend at a tavern about midnight, and after making a round of several
such places, after eating at one, and at about
3 :30 a.m. the defendant drove the party over
21
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a canyon road to a dam and returned to the
city. The morning was dark, and although
there was no snow on the streets, they were
wet and a light snow was falling. Approaching through a residential district where the
speed limit was 30 m.p.h., and while the sleeping girl in the front seat had her head in defendant's lap, lighted cigarette fell from the
latter's mouth into the folds of his clothing
and in attempting to rid himself of it, and
while sparks were flying, defendant lost control of his car. It jumped the curb, travelled
along the lawned parking 192 feet, jumped
several other driveway curbs, sideswiped 2
trees, knocking the rear door off, returned to
the highway and travelled another 183 feet
before being stopped. There is evidence that
defendant at one point on the parking applied
his brakes, but there was no evidence of brake
marks on the street either before the car
jumped the curb or after it returned to the
street. . . . Although we believe a proper
foundation was not laid for this evidence, for
the purposes of this case we may assume the
car was traveiling at 60 n1. p.h. at the time
the accident occurred. . . . "
The court reversed a judgment for the plaintiff and
held:
"Counsel for plaintiff concedes that the
wilful n1isconduct conten1plated under our
guest statute is 'the intentional doing of an
act or intentional omitting or failing to do
an act, with knowledge that serious injury
is a probable and not merely a possible result,
or the intentional doing of an act with wanton and reckless disregard of the possible consequences. 1 '
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"Under the facts of this case, a reasonable person could not conclude that defendant
intentionally did or failed to do an act that
would fall within this definition. These people were friends. There is no fact or combination of facts in the record ·which showed
a wan ton or reckless disregard of the consequences, which in this case were a loss of control due solely to the accidental dropping of
a lighted cigarette in the defendant's clothing
and the car jumping the curb when defendant tried to dispose of the lighted cigarette.
The fact that the girl was asleep with her
head in defendant's lap ·would seem to negative any reckless disregard by the latter for
her well-being. The assumed fact that defendant was travelling 60 m.p.h. in a residential zone was not a fact that would indicate defendant had knowledge or any reason
to believe that such speed probably or even
possibly would result in a lighted cigarette
accidentally falling out of his mouth. Such
an event as v1ell could have occurred while
travelling 25 m.p.h. in any kind of weather
and in any speed zone. It was not the speed,
but the dropping of a lighted cigarette that
resulted in the loss of control, and this accidental and involuntary circumstances cannot be said to be wilful misconduct under any
reasonable theory or basis of fact.
"Cases strikingly similar to the instant
case are Bashor v. Bashor, 103 Colo. 232, 85
23
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P. 2d 732, 120 A. L. R. 1507, where the
driver travelling 45-55 m.p.h., momentarily
withdrew his attention from the road while
turning a radio dial, Neyens v. Gehl, 235
Iowa 115, 15 N. W. 2d 888, where, as here,
the driver, travelling at 50-60 m.p.h. sought
to retrieve a lighted cigarette he had dropped,
and Rindge v. Holbrook, 111 Conn. 72, 149
A. 231, where the driver momentarily lost
control when a bee flew into the car. All hold
that the driver host was not guilty of wilful
misconduct towards his guest passenger.... "
CONCLUSION
The evidence in this case shows the plaintiff
was injured in an accident which occurred on the
highway between Missoula, Montana and Salmon,
Idaho. At that time the Plaintiff was admittedly
a guest passenger in Defendant's automobile. The
Defendant had driven from Moses Lake, Washington and there is not the slightest n1ention in the
Record of his having done so in a reckless, or even
a negligent, manner. As he was proceeding down
hill and around a curve Defendant's car left the
highway and rolled down the side of the bank.
Plain tiff did not offer any other evidence showing
the manner in which the accident occurred. It does
appear from the Record, however, that other witnesses had been able to negotiate the curve at the
speed the Defendant was driving. It also appears
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that the surface of the road at the point of the
curve was covered with sand and gravel.
There seems to be little question that the foregoing does not constitute direct evidence of recklessness as required by the Idaho Guest Statute to
impose liability on the Defendant, and the Plaintiff
does not so argue in his Brief.
What Plaintiff does ask is that the court permit the jury to infer recklessness from the foregoing
evidence. Since there is no evidence of excessive
speed or lack of control, the inference he would have
us make is that the Defendant deliberately drove his
vehicle off the side of the road, thus injuring both
himself and his passenger, although the Record does
not show any reason why he should so intend.
The net effect of permitting such an inferance
would be to allow the issue to go to the jury, or in
other words to impose upon the Defendant the burden of convincing the jury that he was not guilty
of recklessness even though there is no evidence that
he was.
All of the witnesses to this accident who testified, including the Defendant, were called as the
Plaintiff's witnesses. Presumably Plaintiff brought
out all of the evidence which he considered advisable. As was stated by the trial court, he may
have proved the Defendant guilty of simple negli25
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gence but he did not prove the Defendant to be guilty
of recklessness, or even produce sufficient evidence
for the case to go to the jury on this issue. Therefore,
the directed verdict in Defendant's favor rendered
by the trial court in this case should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
& HANSON
Attorneys for
Defendant and Respondent

CANNON
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